Power, mortality, war, and the inability to accept limits
There is an old story Vladimir Putin has told about his childhood in Leningrad. As a boy, he cornered a rat in a stairwell. Instead of surrendering, the terrified animal suddenly turned and attacked him. Putin has recalled the incident as a lesson about the dangers of cornering an adversary.
It is an interesting story, because, more than seventy years later, Putin may find himself confronting a predicament that resembles his own childhood encounter. Except that this time, he may be the rat.
The analogy is not intended to suggest that Russia is on the verge of military collapse, or that Putin has exhausted every option available to him. Neither conclusion is supported by the evidence. It raises a more troubling possibility: that a leader who has invested his authority, reputation and historical ambitions in a war may become increasingly dangerous as the gap widens between what he demands and what he can realistically achieve.
The longer the war in Ukraine continues, the more difficult it becomes to identify what would constitute a satisfactory Russian victory.
And that is the problem
The Expanding Definition of Victory
Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 with objectives that included changing Ukraine’s political and strategic orientation. Moscow expected to exercise far greater influence over the country’s future than it had previously been able to achieve.
More than four years later, Ukraine remains an independent state, its national identity has been reinforced by the invasion, and its relationship with Europe has deepened.
Russia controls substantial Ukrainian territory, and its military continues to inflict enormous destruction. Yet territorial occupation is not the same as achieving the political objectives that originally motivated the war.
Putin’s demands have evolved
His latest proposal for a Russian-controlled security zone inside Ukraine, principally along the northern and northeastern border, is revealing. Moscow presents the zone as necessary to protect Russian territory from Ukrainian attacks.
But the argument contains a fundamental contradiction.
Russia invaded Ukraine. Ukraine subsequently attacked targets inside Russia as part of its defence. Moscow now invokes those attacks to justify occupying additional Ukrainian territory.
A territorial buffer cannot provide absolute security against modern drones and long-range missiles.
The proposed zone therefore raises a question: is it a military necessity, a negotiating instrument, or another expansion of the conditions Putin considers necessary for victory?
These explanations are not mutually exclusive.
What matters is that the definition of an acceptable outcome appears increasingly difficult to separate from new territorial and security demands.
A leader who continually expands the conditions for victory may find that victory itself becomes an ever-receding objective.
When Continuing the War Becomes More Important Than Winning It
We assume that a leader who starts a war wants to win it and then enjoy the benefits of victory. But that assumption deserves examination.
For a government built around concentrated personal authority, war can perform functions beyond its declared military objectives.
It can justify extraordinary expenditure, tighter political controls, restrictions on dissent and the mobilization of society around an external enemy. It can make criticism appear disloyal and transform difficult domestic questions into matters of national security.
This does not prove that Putin continues the war for those reasons. He may believe that time favors Russia, that Ukraine will eventually become exhausted, or that its allies will lose the willingness to sustain assistance.

Nevertheless, there is an important distinction between a war that serves a political purpose and a war that can produce a sustainable political settlement.
Ending the conflict would bring Russia face to face with problems that continued warfare can postpone.
Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and veterans would have to be reintegrated into civilian society. Wounded servicemen and their families would require long-term support. The economy would have to adjust to a different pattern of expenditure and production. Damaged international relationships, demographic pressures, and the consequences of years of isolation would remain. The Russian government would have to explain what had been achieved, and whether the outcome justified the immense human and economic costs.
These are problems of governance rather than conquest.

Putin has demonstrated considerable ability to preserve political authority and mobilize state resources. But those abilities are not synonymous with good governance,when measured by accountability, institutional independence, protection of citizens’ rights and the long-term welfare of society.
Indeed, there is a disturbing possibility that prolonging the war may be politically easier than confronting the consequences of ending it. A war can postpone problems that peace would make impossible to ignore.
The Man Who Cannot Escape Mortality
There is another dimension to this predicament, one that geopolitical analysis neglects.

Putin is a mortal man.
This may sound obvious, almost banal. Yet the extraordinary accumulation of political power can obscure a simple reality: no leader, however powerful, can exercise authority indefinitely.
History is full of rulers who pursued grand ambitions, accumulated territories, built monuments and imagined that their achievements would survive them.
But mortality eventually imposes the one limitation that political power cannot remove.
Ordinary people sometimes arrive at an acceptance of this truth. We have all encountered elderly individuals who, having lived full lives, approach death with a certain serenity. They have loved, struggled, worked, succeeded and failed. They recognize that their time is ending, and they can accept it.
For someone whose identity has become inseparable from power, accepting limits may be more complicated. Putin has spent more than a quarter of a century at the centre of Russian political life. He has constructed a system in which his authority is intertwined with the institutions of the state.
The war in Ukraine has become one of the defining undertakings of his rule. What happens if he comes to believe that he cannot obtain a victory sufficient to justify its costs, but also cannot accept the political consequences of compromise?
One possibility is that he continues fighting, he expects a decisive victory, but because continuing postpones the need to acknowledge an unsatisfactory outcome.
Another possibility is that he believes history will eventually vindicate him, even if the conflict remains unresolved during his lifetime.
And then there is a third, more unsettling hypothesis.
Après moi, le déluge.
After me, the flood.
Putin believes he can continue the war for as long as he remains in power, leaving its eventual resolution and consequences to his successors.
We cannot know whether he thinks this way. There is no reliable access to his private reflections on mortality or his ultimate intentions.
But the possibility deserves consideration because it exposes a fundamental difference between the personal time horizon of a ruler and the historical time horizon of a nation.

Putin’s life will end. Russia’s will not.
Russia will inherit the economic consequences, demographic losses, political tensions, damaged relationships and unresolved territorial questions long after Putin has departed.
A ruler may be able to postpone accountability during his lifetime. A country cannot indefinitely escape the consequences of its history.
The History He Lived Through but Failed to Understand
This brings us to the most striking contradiction of all. Putin invokes history.
He speaks about the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, the Second World War, historical borders and the supposed unity of Russians and Ukrainians. He has devoted considerable attention to constructing a historical narrative that supports his political objectives.
Yet there is another history, much closer to his own lifetime, from which he appears to have drawn different lessons.
The history of Eastern Europe.
The collapse of Soviet domination. The liberation of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other countries from communist rule. The fall of the Berlin Wall. German reunification. The dissolution of the Soviet Union itself.
Putin did not need to read about these events. He witnessed them. He was serving as a KGB officer in Dresden when East Germany’s communist regime collapsed in 1989.
He experienced firsthand the disintegration of a political order that had appeared formidable, permanent and supported by enormous military power.
Yet that order collapsed with astonishing speed. And why?
The explanations were numerous: economic stagnation, political failures, the reform policies of Mikhail Gorbachev, the erosion of communist legitimacy and the determination of Eastern European societies to regain political freedom.
But one lesson was unmistakable.
Military domination does not produce political allegiance. The Soviet Union had maintained its influence over Eastern Europe for decades through military power, political coercion and institutional control.
Yet when the opportunity emerged, those societies overwhelmingly sought a different future. They did not regard Soviet domination as a privilege they were reluctant to lose.
They regarded its end as liberation.
Putin appears to have interpreted those events as evidence of Soviet weakness, political indecision and a failure to defend state authority. That interpretation is consistent with his later emphasis on restoring Russian power and preventing what he considers further geopolitical retreat.
But it overlooks another lesson: the people living under Soviet domination had their own political identities, aspirations and understanding of their national interests.
This is the historical contradiction: the invasion of Ukraine.
Putin has repeatedly invoked the historical connections between Russia and Ukraine to challenge the legitimacy of Ukraine’s independent political course.
Yet Ukraine’s resistance demonstrates what the Eastern European revolutions demonstrated decades earlier: historical ties, military superiority and claims of common identity cannot compel a population to accept political domination.
One can occupy territory without securing the allegiance of the people who live there. One can impose political control without creating legitimacy. And one can possess overwhelming military resources without achieving the political outcome those resources were intended to produce.
Putin has spent much of his political career looking backward toward the territories and influence Russia lost. He appears to have paid less attention to why many of those societies wanted to leave Moscow’s orbit in the first place.
He looks at history through the window of Russian power. But history looks different from Warsaw, Prague, Tallinn, Berlin or Kyiv.

The Danger of the Cornered Rat
I return, finally, to the rat.
The danger of a cornered animal is not that it possesses great strength. It is that, perceiving no acceptable escape, it may attack despite the risks.
The analogy is imperfect. Putin commands a state with enormous resources, a substantial military and a nuclear arsenal. He retains options that a trapped animal does not possess.
Nor should we assume that every escalation is evidence of desperation. Actions may reflect calculated attempts to improve Russia’s negotiating position. Nevertheless, the analogy highlights an important risk.
If Putin comes to regard compromise as a threat to his authority, and if he defines victory in terms that become increasingly difficult to achieve, then the incentives to continue or escalate the conflict may persist even as its returns diminish.
No longer whether Russia possesses the resources to continue fighting. It is whether Putin has a politically acceptable way to stop.
A negotiated settlement would require choices about territory, security guarantees, Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s future relationship with Europe.
It might require acknowledging that the original objectives of the invasion cannot be achieved.
For a leader who has invested much in the conflict, that may be a difficult admission. Yet the alternative carries its own dangers.
Continuing the war does not guarantee eventual success. It may deepen the costs, reinforce Ukrainian resistance, accelerate European military development and leave Russia facing an increasingly difficult postwar adjustment.
A prolonged conflict can preserve the appearance of determination while steadily reducing the benefits that a settlement might otherwise secure. This is why the distinction between waging war and winning it matters much.
A government can continue fighting long after its original strategic objectives have become unattainable. And a ruler can remain politically secure even while his country’s long-term position deteriorates.
After Putin, Russia Remains
The greatest irony is that Putin presents himself as a defender of Russian history and national destiny. Yet the future of Russia extends far beyond his own lifetime. The country will eventually have to confront the consequences of the war, regardless of how its present leadership chooses to describe them.
Its citizens will inherit the economic burdens, the human losses, the relationships with neighboring countries and the institutions shaped by these years.
Whether those consequences are being considered in decisions made today. Putin may sincerely believe that he is defending Russia’s historical interests. He may believe that time will vindicate his actions. He may expect to achieve an outcome that he can present as victory. Or he may increasingly regard the continuation of the war as preferable to facing its unresolved contradictions.
We should not confuse these hypotheses with established knowledge of his private motivations. But we can examine the observable consequences of his decisions.
We can ask whether his territorial demands are becoming more achievable or less. Whether Russia’s long-term economic and demographic position is improving or deteriorating. Whether military operations are producing durable political gains. Whether he is preparing institutions capable of managing a postwar future.
And above all, whether he has identified a settlement that would allow Russia to stop fighting without requiring Ukraine to surrender its sovereignty.
The history of Eastern Europe offers a powerful warning.
The Soviet Union possessed immense military power, yet it could not indefinitely preserve a political order that millions of people rejected.
Putin lived through that transformation. He witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of Soviet authority across Eastern Europe. He saw that military power has limits. And yet, decades later, he launched a war that has once again demonstrated the determination of a European nation to resist domination.
History’s important lessons are not always the ones that powerful men choose to remember. And the ultimate tragedy of Putin’s war is that, in trying to reverse the consequences of the Soviet collapse, he may be reproducing the errors that helped bring that system to an end.
The cornered rat may continue to fight. But fighting is not the same as winning. And when the rat is finally gone, the consequences of its struggle will remain.








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